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-. Introduction
Rape. Murder. Kidnapping. Robbery. These are the types of crimes
that people generally think of when they picture a crime victim. Several
television shows are based around these victims, their stories, and the
criminal justice system designed to protect both them and the communities
they live in.' Since as early as 1704, victims have had their cases
2
prosecuted in court by a local public prosecutor. In Berger v. United
3
States, the Court said that the prosecutor is the "representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all."'4 This
quote highlights the role of prosecutor as the State 's representative, not the
victim's. For nearly three centuries, this adversarial style of criminal
prosecution reigned supreme, oftentimes leaving victims on the outside
looking in.' To remedy this situation, Congress passed a series of laws over
the last three decades, culmninating with the Crime Victims' Rights Act
1. E.g., Law & Order: Special Victims Unit (NBC television broadcast).
2. See Mary L. Boland & Russell Butler, Crime Victims' Rights. From Illusion to
Reality, 24 CiRI. JUST., no. 1, Spring 2009, at 4, 8-9 ('In colonial America, crime victims
prosecuted their own criminal cases, in keeping with the common law in which there was no
public prosecutor. But this form of justice was available only to those with resources, and
was replaced as early as 1704 with local public prosecutors.").
3. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1935) (holding that applying "section
269 of the Judicial Code, as amended, to the circumstances of this caset,] the variance was
not prejudicial and hence not fatal").
4. Id. at 88.
5. See Eri C. Blondel, Note, Victims' Rights in An Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J.
237, 239 (2008) ("[T~he adversary system fails to consider others whose interests litigation
may affect.").
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(CVRA) 6 in 2004, which sought to provide crime victims with greater
rights to ensure that they were not shut out of the criminal proceedings of
their aggressors. When Congress passed these laws, legislators and
victims' rights advocates were mainly concerned with victims of violent
crimes, such as rape, murder, kidnapping, and robbery. In all likelihood,
advocates of these laws had no idea that this legislation would have much
more far-reaching consequences than originally intended.
Increasingly, the CVRA is being used by victims to participate in the
trials of corporate defendants accused of committing environmental
crimes.7 Victims' rights advocates assert that this new development is a
natural progression to ensure the protection of victims of environmental
crimes.8 This development has drawn the ire of many corporate defense
attorneys, who question whether this was the Act's intended purpose and
lament its unintended consequences on the prosecution of environmental
criminals. 9 While only a few cases have dealt with the issue, it is evident
that the application of the CVRA to victims of environmental crimes will
have far-reaching implications for the prosecution of environmental crimes
and the ability of defense attorneys and prosecutors to plea bargain. 10
Nowhere is this more apparent than with the fallout of the recent BP oil
spill. Millions of gallons of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico and

6. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nita Lynn,
Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006).
7. See Tresa Baldas, A New Type of Crime Victim Is Speaking Up, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
20, 2009, at 4 ("A law that was designed to empower crime victims and give them a stronger
voice in the justice system is increasingly being used as a weapon to punish companies
accused of environmental crimes.").
8. See, e.g., id. (quoting an environmental rights advocate, who commented that
environmental crime is "one of the new areas where crime victims advocates are trying to
make sure victims' rights are protected" and that the CVRA "was designed to extend rights
to all victims of crimes-across the board").
9. See, e.g., id. (quoting two former chiefs of the Department of Justice's
Environmental Crimes Section who believe that the CVRA "was originally intended for
fraud, murder, and drug cases, not environmental crimes" and that including victims of
environmental crimes under the Act blurs "the criminal process with the traditional civil
process").
10. See Judson W. Starr et at., A New Intersection: Environmental Crimes and

Victims' Rights, 23

NAT. RESOURCES

& ENV'T, no. 3, Winter 2009, at 41, 42 [hereinafter

Starr et al., A New Intersection] ("[T]he assertion of CVRA rights by victims of the BP
explosion proves that the statute has the potential to dramatically change the manner in
which environmental crimes are prosecuted and the ability of prosecutors and defendants to
resolve such charges through plea agreements.").
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impacted millions of people across the five gulf states: Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida."'
This Note considers the question of whether or not Congress intended
for the CVRA to grant broad rights to victims of environmental crimes and
whether anything should be done to remedy the problems that have arisen
as a result of this interpretation. Part 11 of this Note surveys the history and
complexities surrounding environmental crimes and the particular features
that distinguish it from other disciplines of criminal law. Part III focuses on
how the Crime Victims' Rights Movement unfolded and how its history
influenced the development and goals of the CVRA. Part [V then turns to
the text of the CVRA itself and looks to case law to examine how courts
have interpreted the Act. Finally, Part V examines the numerous practical
problems created by the assertion of these expansive rights and concludes
that Congress should amend the CYRA to exclude victims of environmental
crimes.
H. EnvironmentalCrimes
A. History of Environmental CriminalProsecution in the United States
When Congress enacted major environmental statutes in the 1970s,
such as the Clean Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), and Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), Congress sought to achieve its pollutionThis
reducing goals primarily through the use of civil law penalties.'
changed in 1982 with the establishment of the Department of Justice's
(DOJ) Environental Crimes Unit, which focused exclusively on the
prosecution of environmental criminals who violated the environmental
criminal programs established by Congress.'" A major impetus behind the
creation of environmental criminal programs was the fact that some of the
largest environmental polluters tended to be corporations, their employees,
11. See Seeking Answers on Oil Spill as Questions Mount, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010,
at All (noting that "projected eventual losses for the [five] gulf states [are] at ... $11.5
billion").
12. See Michael M. O'Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment,
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIN4. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 142 (2004)
(stating that while these statutes included criminal enforcement provisions, they were limited
to "misdemeanor-level sanctions for violators").
13. See Judson W. Starr & Yvette D. Williams, Environmental Crimes in Perspective,
SGO14 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 3 (2001) [hereinafter Starr & Williams, Environmental Crimes]
(hypothesizing that the establishment of this department was the catalyst for the increase in
environmental crimes prosecutions).
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or officers.'14 Because civil suits do not deter corporations-which can pass
monetary fines onto consumers-as well as they deter individuals,
Congress realized that environmental criminal programs were necessary for
these environmental regulatory programs to reach their full potential."5
"Congress understood that an environmental law program must have a
punitive dimension [that goes beyond economic incentives] to deter
violators effectively."'16 This punitive dimension includes the social stigma
attached to corporations convicted of environmental crimes,'17 and also the
jail time that may be served by convicted officers or directors of the

corporations. 1
The number of environmental criminal prosecutions escalated rapidly
over the three decades since the programs' inception. i 1984, the EPA
referred thirty-one matters to the DOJ for criminal prosecution, while the
DOJ charged thirty-six defendants altogether.' 9 In 2006, the EPA initiated
over 300 environental criminal cases and charged 278 defendants .20 This
increase in environmental criminal prosecution has generally been met with
support from the public. 2 ' Indeed, even the most vehement critics of the
14. See Kathleen Brickey, The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability,
Discretion, and Structural Reform, 84 IOWA L. REv. 115, 140 (1998) [hereinafter Brickey,
The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime] (conducting a study that revealed that most of the
environmental criminal cases "were brought against company owners or part-owners,
corporate officers, high level managers, or those who had supervisory authority or other
comparable responsibility, on account of their personal involvement in the violation").
15. See Starr & Williams, Environmental Crimes, supra note 13, at 3 ("[T]he threat of
incarceration undoubtedly deters other corporate officials from engaging in or countenancing
similar misconduct and causes them to become more compliance-conscious.").
.16.
Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2452
(1995).
17. See Starr & Williams, Environmental Crimes, supra note 13, at 3 (discussing the
high costs corporations are paying for environmental criminal convictions, particularly "as
public concern for the environment and demands for higher standards of corporate
accountability grow").
18. Kathleen Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection Of
Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 506 (1996) [hereinafter
Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads] ("Stated differently, jail time is one cost
of business that cannot be passed on to the consumer.").
19. O'Hear, supra note 12, at 143.
20. Krista McIntyre, Current Trends in Enforcement of Environmental Crimes, 50
ADVOC. 31, 31 (2007). The dramatic increase in prosecutions resulted in a total of 154 years
of incarceration and $43 million in fines for environmental crimes. Id.
21. See Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads, supra note 18, at 488-89
("Notwithstanding that environmental crime is relatively new to the criminal law lexicon and
the environmental consciousness as we know it has only recently emerged, there is
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environental crimes programs concede that the programs pursue worthy
goals of discouraging individuals and corporations from breaking the law. 2
B. Complexities Surrounding the Prosecutionof Environmental Crimes
Despite the general support for environmental criminal prosecutions,
critics question whether criminal laws should apply to environmental law in
the same manner as other disciplines of law. Some scholars argue that
certain characteristics of environmental law, such as its aspirational
qualities, evolutionary nature, and high degree of complexity, distinguish it
from other areas of the law.2 Environmental statutes are aspirational in
nature because they do not "codify existing norms of behavior, but ...
[rather] force dramatic changes in existing behavior.",2 4 Because the science
surrounding environmental law changes constantly, "the solutions
themselves are in a constant state of revision.",2 5 The evolutionary nature of
environmental law contributes to the various statutes' high level of
complexity, as "environmental laws reflect the complexities of the
ecosystem itself.",26 These characteristics distinguish environmental law
from other types of law, with some experts arguing that these distinctions
27
make criminal law less suited for environmental applications.
widespread public support for treating culpable environmental violations as serious
crimes.").
22. See, e.g., Starr & Williams, Environmental Crimes, supra note 13, at 3 ("Although
some might dispute whether the environmental crimes program has achieved its goals, few
dispute that these goals are worthwhile. It is difficult to oppose a program that seeks to
punish those who intentionally violate laws enacted to protect our country's health, welfare,
safety, and natural resources.").
23. See Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads, supra note 18, at 497-98
('Some scholars maintain that environmental law has distinctive features that set it apart
from other specialized areas of law. Richard Lazarus, the leading proponent of this school
of thought, has identified the aspirational qualities, evolutionary nature, and high degree of
complexity as the most notable distinguishing attibutes. .. )
24. Lazarus, supra note 16, at 2424. The aspirational nature of environmental law is
reflected in the fact that these statutes have met few of the deadlines and goals originally set.
See id. at 2425-26 (noting that while there has been significant improvement in the quality
of our air, water, and other natural resources, the results have still fallen short of most of the
targets set in the various environmental statutes).
25. Id. at 2426-27.
26. Id. at 2429.
27. See id. at 2426 ("1[qt does not inexorably follow that such aspirational laws are
equally well suited to civil and criminal enforcement."). However, there is also a vocal
group of scholars who believe that these distinctions are overstated. See Brickey, The
Rhetoric of Environmental Crime, supra note 14, at 117 ("[C]ritics' proposals for structural
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In addition to these particular characteristics that distinguish
environmental law from other disciplines, other scholars argue that
environmental criminal prosecutions may inhibit one of the most effective
tools of environmental law, voluntary disclosure.2 The EPA's Voluntary
Disclosure Policy allows companies to disclose actual or potential
violations in exchange for lesser civil fines .29 From 1996 to 2001, 1,150
companies made disclosures at more than 5,400 facilities nationwide.3
Despite the voluntary disclosure program's relative success, its progress is
hindered by complications dealing with possible criminal charges that
might arise as a consequence of the corporation's disclosure . 3 '1 The
possibility of criminal charges forces corporations to make the difficult
decision of whether to disclose a statutory violation when it could possibly
lead to criminal charges against the corporation or its employees 3. Thus,
despite the success that the advent of environmental criminal prosecution
has had on reigning in statutory violations, it is evident that there are
serious issues and concerns surrounding the prosecution of environmental
criminals that distinguish environmental law from other areas of law.
III The Crime Victims 'Rights Movement
A. HistoricalContext of the Crime Victims 'Rights Movement
The crime victims' rights movement began in the mid- 1960s with the
founding of victim assistance programs in California, Washington, D.C.,
and Missouri, which sought to assist crime victims previously left out by
the criminal justice system."3 These victims assistance programs emerged
reform of environmental criminal law are based upon mistaken factual assumptions about
prosecutorial practices and problems uniquely identified with environmental prosecutions.").
28. See Starr & Williams, Environmental Crimes, supra note 13, at 7 (stating that the
EPA's Voluntary Disclosure Policy was established in early 1996 to encourage companies to
voluntarily disclose their statutory violations).
29. See id. (describing how "GTE disclosed 600 violations at 314 facilities in 21
states, yet received only a $52,000 penalty (the economic benefit of its noncompliance)").
3 0. Id
3 1. See id. at I11 ("From a criminal defense perspective, the EPA Voluntary Disclosure
Policy provides almost no protection.").
32. See id. ("EPA's Policy provides individuals with no protections against criminal
prosecution. Until the Policy addresses this issue, it will offer very limited incentive for
companies to bring voluntary disclosures to the EPA Board.").
33. See Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell. Stephanie
Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims 'Rights Act, 9 LEwts &
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due to a growing concern amongst victims' advocates that "[v]ictims of
crime often do not feel their voices are heard or that their concerns are
adequately addressed in the judicial process."0 4 The crime victims' rights
movement picked up steam over the next decade as more and more
prominent cases developed in which crime victims and their families were
shut out of the courtroom and were not notified of the case's proceedings.3
Prior to the crime victims' rights movement, the criminal justice system
"treat[ed] all crimes as acts committed only against the community, and
36
consequently gave the direct victims of crime, little, if any, recognition.
Victims' advocates pointed at this "perceived imbalance in the criminal
justice system ... [and argued that] the criminal justice system had become
preoccupied with defendants' rights to the exclusion of considering the
37
legitimate interests of crime victims."

The crime victims' rights movement gained national prominence in
1981 when President Reagan established National Victims' Rights Week
and formed the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime (Task Force) to
investigate the current status of crime victims in federal courts.3" After
conducting extensive hearings, the Task Force issued a series of
recommended reforms to the criminal justice system, including that
"1prosecutors assume the responsibility for keeping victims notified of all
court proceedings[,] ... that courts receive victim-impact evidence at
sentencing, order restitution in most cases, and allow victims and their
families to attend trials.",39 These reforms "are the origin of many of the
L. REv. 581, 584 (2005) (stating that the programs were aimed particularly at
assisting women and young victims of sexual and domestic violence).
34. H.R. REP. No. 108-711, at 2 (2004).
35. See Steven Joffee, Note, Validating Victims: Enforcing Victims' Rights Through
Mandatory Mandamus, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 241, 242 (2009) (citing the 1977 murder case of
Wendy Preston in Florida and the 1979 murder case of Louarna Gillis as two instances in
which the adversarial system prevented the victims' survivors from attending the trial).
36. Kyl et al., supra note 33, at 583; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text
(quoting the Supreme Court's interpretation of the prosecution representing the community
as a whole, not merely the victim).
37. Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims in the
FederalRules of CriminalProcedure,2007 UTAH L. REv. 861, 865 (2007).
38. See Kyl et al, supra note 33, at 584 (noting that President Reagan was "the first
president to publicly acknowledge the role of the victim in the criminal justice system").
39. Cassell, supra note 37, at 865. The Task Force remarked that "the criminal justice
system has lost an essential balance. .... [Tlhe system has deprived the innocent, the honest,
and the helpless of its protection. .... The victims of crime have been transformed into a
group oppressively burdened by a system designed to protect them. This oppression must be

CLARK

redressed."

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT

114 (1982).
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reforms sought by the movement for securing crime victims'

rights.",40

To

achieve these reforms, the Task Force "proposed a federal constitutional
amendment to protect crime victims' rights.",4 ' It should be noted that the
Task Force's extensive findings published in its Final Report make no
mention of environmental crimes, but instead focus on violent crimes, such
as rape, kidnapping, murder, child molestation, and armed robbery.4 This
indicates that when the Task Force recommended federal legislation and a
constitutional amendment to secure rights for crime victims, it likely did not
anticipate that victims in environmental criminal cases would eventually
use this legislation.
B. From Statute to Amendment andBack Again
In response to the Task Force's recommendations, victims' rights
advocates worked with state government officials to enact state
constitutional amendments granting crime victims greater rights.4
Realizing the difficulty of passing a federal constitutional amendment,
victims' rights advocates instead focused their initial efforts on passing
federal legislation."4 Their efforts were met with immediate success with
Congress passing the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 '4 "which
gave victims the right to make an impact statement at sentencing and
provided expanded restitution.",46 In the following years, Congress passed
several acts expanding the protections afforded to crime victims, including
the Victims of Crime Act of 1984,~ the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act
of 199048
40.
41.

the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 '49

Kyl et al., supra note 33, at 584.
Cassell, supra note 37, at 866.

42. See

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMs OF CRIME,

supra note 39, at 2-3

(describing some of the testimony that was given during the Task Force's interviews of
crime victims).
43. See Cassell, supra note 37, at 866 (describing the considerable success of this
strategy with over thirty states to date adopting crime victims' rights amendments to their
state constitutions).
44. See id. (noting the near consensus needed to pass a constitutional amendment).
45. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248
(1982).
46. Cassell, supra note 37, at 866.
47. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (1984).
48. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4820 (1990).
49. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
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the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,50 and the
Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997.5' Despite the fact that all of these
laws purported to secure greater rights for crime victims, in practice, the
protections they sought to afford still fell short, which was glaringly evident
during the trial of Timothy McVeigh. When surviving victims of the
bombing who intended to provide impact statements at sentencing sought to
exercise their rights under the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990
to attend the trial, the trial judge barred them from doing so. 52
The failures of these statutes to guarantee crime victims' rights led to
renewed efforts by victims' rights advocates to pass a constitutional
amendment. 53 In September 1996, with the support of President Clinton,
Senators Kyl and Feinstein introduced a Federal Victims' Rights
Amendment in the Senate, which would grant crime victims:
[Tihe rights to notice of and not to be excluded from ... proceedings
relating to the crime; to be heard if present. . . ; to notice of a release ..
or an escape; to a final disposition free from unreasonable delay; to an
order of restitution from the convicted offender; to have the safety of the
victim considered in determining a release from custody ... [and]
standing to assert the rights established.5
50. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
51. Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12 (1997).
52. See United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 328 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting how the
district court judge invoked Federal Rule of Evidence 615, citing the prejudice that may
result if a testifying witness attended the trial); see also Joffee, supra note 35, at 244
(describing how this turn-of-events led to a renewed effort by victims' advocates to pass a
federal constitutional amendment). Interestingly, Paul G. Cassell, as well as many other
individuals, attributes the failure of the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 to its
codification in Title 42 of the United States Code, which deals with "Public Health and
Welfare." Cassell, supra note 37, at 867. By placing the Act in Title 42 instead of Title 18
(which deals with "Crimes and Criminal Procedure"), the Act was overlooked by most
federal judges and criminal law practitioners. Id. Since these rights were not listed in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, most judges failed to enforce the rights provided to
crime victims in the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 108171, at 3 (2004) ("Crime victims already have a listing of rights in Title 42 of the United
States Code. However, because those rights are not enumerated in the criminal code, most
practitioners do not even know these rights exist.").
53. See S. REP. No. 106-254, at 9 (2000) ("It is the view of the [Senate Judiciary]
Committee that a Federal amendment is the only way to ensure that victims' opportunity to
participate in the criminal justice process is fully satisfied.").
54. S.J. Res. 65, 104th Cong. (1996); see also Cassell, supra note 37, at 868
(describing the amendment as having seven core principles, including the right to notice of
proceedings, the right to be present at the proceedings, the right to be heard at the
proceedings, and the right to reasonable protection).
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Despite President Clinton's backing, the amendment failed to pass.55 Over
the next eight years, Senators Kyl and Feinstein continued to propose the
amendment during each new session of Congress, but, despite the backing
of both Presidents Clinton and Bush, the amendment failed to gamer the
56
necessary votes to pass.
Critics of the amendment gave several reasons for opposing it. First,
they thought that an amendment was unnecessary to secure crime victims
greater rights"7 and that a statute was more appropriate to secure such
rights.5 Critics also thought that an amendment could "open a Pandora's
box of dangerous and unintended consequences"09 for the criminal justice
system. Among the concerns were restricting prosecutorial discretion,
particularly with regard to plea bargaining, undermining fundamental
constitutional rights of the accused, such as the right to a fair trial, and
imposing tremendous costs on the system .60 Finally, and most significantly,
critics argued that the drafting of the constitutional amendment was
In particular, with each introduction into the Senate, the
problematic.6
Opponents of the
language of the amendment changed significantly.6
amendment believed that the frequent changes to the language reflected
These criticisms are
uncertainty regarding the amendment's reach.6
55. See Cassell, supra note 37, at 868 ('The amendment failed to pass in the 104th
Congress.").
56. See Kyl et al., supra note 33, at 589-90 (stating that the Senate Judiciary
Committee passed the proposed amendment on three different occasions, but it never
obtained the necessary sixty-seven votes in the Senate to pass).
57. See S. REP. No. 108-191, at 50 (2003) ("Amendment is appropriate only when
there is a pressing need that cannot be addressed by other means. No such need exists in
order to protect the rights of crime victims.... Nothing in our current Constitution inhibits
the enactment of State or federal laws that protect crime victims.").
58. See id. at 51 ("[Sjuch an approach is significantly more flexible. It would more
easily accommodate a measured approach, and allow for the 'fine tuning' if deemed
necessary or desirable by Congress after the various concepts in the Act are applied in actual
cases across the country.").
5 9. Id at 5 8.
60. Id at 63-70.
61. See id. at 81-86 (pointing out that key terms in the amendment, such as "victim,"
"violent crime," and "reasonable and timely notice" were undefined).
62. Compare S.J. Res 44, 105th Cong (1998), and S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. (1997),
with S.J. Res. 35, 107th Cong. (2002), and S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. (1999), (demonstrating
the significant changes in the text and the organization of the amendment in each
introduction).
63. See S. REP'. No. 108-19 1, at 81 (2003) ("There have been some 64 drafts of this
proposed constitutional amendment and they have differed substantially. ... The fact that
this proposal changes in form and substance from year to year does not inspire confidence
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important to note, particularly since they echo many of the criticisms
regarding the CVRA,64 discussed in greater detail in Part V.B.2.
In addition to these criticisms of the amendment, it is important to note
Specifically, the
the original focus of the amendment's protections.
Judiciary Committee's Report on the constitutional amendment focused
In fact, the constitutional
entirely on victims of violent crimes.6
amendment's text itself extended only to victims of violent crimes.6 Thus,
it can be gleaned from these facts that the members of the Judiciary
Committee, and likely most of Congress, were most concerned with and
focused on protecting victims of violent crimes when their efforts abruptly
shifted from passing a constitutional amendment to passing the CVRA, as
discussed below.
Ultimately, Senators Kyl and Feinstein realized that it was imprudent
to expect a constitutional amendment would pass.6 Therefore, in 2004,
victims' rights advocates again turned their efforts to a federal statute that
would afford crime victims the protections it failed to provide in its
On April 21, 2004, Senators Kyl and Feinstein
previous attempts.6
introduced the CVRA,6 which was signed into law by President Bush on
October 9, 2004 and described as "the most sweeping federal victims'
that we have discerned the correct formula.").
64. See Starr et al., A New Intersection, supra note 10, at 48-49 (explaining how the
CVRA can thwart plea agreements, delay trial proceedings substantially, and cause
confusion over who qualifies as a crime victim under the Act).
65. See S. REP. No. 106-254, at 2 (2000) ("One of the most extraordinary aspects of
the several hearings the Committee has held on this issue is the broad consensus among
proponents and opponents alike that violent crime victims have a deep, innate, and wholly
legitimate interest in the cases that victims bring to the justice system for resolution.").
66. See id. at 27 (stating that "[cirimes of violence" will include "all forms of
homicide .... sexual assault, kidnapping, robbery, assault, mayhem, battery, extortion
accompanied by threats of violence, carjacking, vehicular offenses .. . which result in
personal injury, domestic violence, and other similar crimes").
67. See 150 CONG. REc. S4260-01, S4261 (2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)
("[A]fter numerous Judiciary Committee subcommittee hearings, committee hearings,
markups, putting the victims' rights constitutional amendment out on the Senate floor in a
prior session, .. . and recognizing that we didn't have the 67 votes necessary for a
constitutional amendment-both Senator Kyl and I ... decided that we should
compromise.").
68. See Cassell, supra note 37, at 869 ("After it had become clear that the necessary
super-majority votes were not available to amend the Constitution, victims' advocates turned
their attention to enactment of a comprehensive victims' rights statute.").
69. See Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louama Gillis, and Nila
Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) (attempting to protect the rights
of crime victims during and after court proceedings and passing by a count of 393 votes to
14 votes in the House and by unanimous vote in the Senate).
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of this Note studies the
rights law in the history of the nation." 70 Part WV
CVRA by examining its legislative history, statutory language, and relevant
case law.
IV The Crime Victims 'Rights Act
A. Legislative History of the Crime Victims 'Rights Act
The legislative history of the CVRA is limited due to the absence of
any committee hearings on the statute in either the Senate 7 ' or the House of
Representatives. 72 The Senate did not even publish a committee report on
the CVRA.7 While the House of Representatives did publish a committee

report on the bill, 74 it does not provide much guidance, neglecting even to
define a "crime VitM0
The statute was abruptly introduced in Congress after the sponsors of
the CVRA, Senators Feinstein and Kyl, failed to gamner the necessary votes
for a constitutional amendment that would ensure the rights of crime
victims. 76

The statute attempted to incorporate as many of the provisions of

the constitutional amendment as possible.7 By looking at the CVRA, it is
evident that it was first intended as a constitutional amendment, since "the
70. Kyl et al., supra note 33, at 583.
71. See 150 CONG. REc. S4260-01, S4272 (statement of Sen. Leahy) ('Given the
Republican leadership's insistence on proceeding to the constitutional amendment today,
there was not as much time as I would have liked to develop the statutory alternative that we
vote on today, and no time to hold hearings to improve the bill in Committee.").
72. See H.R. REP. No. 108-711, at 5 (2004) ("No hearings were held in the Committee
on the Judiciary on H.R. 5107.").
73. See United States v. Atd. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460
(2009) ("[T]here was no Senate Committee report on the CVRA.").
74. Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004).
75. See id. ("The House Committee report was silent on the meaning of that term,
See generally H.R. REP. No.
(referrng to the definition of a victim under the Act] .").
108-711 (describing the underlying reasons for the necessity of the bill, but providing little
guidance as to its application, focusing instead primarily on other portions of the bill dealing
with DNA evidence and technology).
76. See 150 CONG. REc. S4260-01, S4261 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) ("[A]fter
numerous Judiciary Committee subcommittee hearings, committee hearings, markups,
putting the victims' righxts constitutional amendment out on the Senate floor in a prior
session... and recognizing that we didn't have the 67 votes necessary for a constitutional
amendment-both Senator Kyl and I .. . decided that we should compromise.").
77. See id at S4264 (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("T'he legislation, as I will describe in a
moment, will attempt to accomplish as much as possible the same goals the constitutional
amendment which has been pending before us would have accomplished.").
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CVRA reads more like an amendment than a statute, with sweeping
statements of rights and no discussion of how those rights should be

implemented.0

8

Despite their brevity, the floor statements of Senators Feinstein, Kyl,
and Leahy do provide some framework as to the intentions of the statute.
While the floor statements were generally broad and did not provide much
guidance in terms of specific situations in which the CVRA should be
utilized, the senators did anticipate cases in which a large number of
victims might be affected . 79 The CVRA's sponsors also likely intended that
a wide swath of crime victims should be protected under the Act. 80 It is
interesting to note, however, that the floor statements focus entirely on the
stories of murder victims when they depict the types of individuals that the
CVRA was intended to protect.8 In fact, Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper,
Wendy Preston, Lourna Gillis, and Nila Lynn, the namesakes of the CVRA,
were all brutally murdered. 82 While this does not necessarily limit the
statute's scope to protect only murder victims, it does show that the bill's
sponsors were particularly focused on and concerned with protecting the
rights of victims of the most egriegious crimes. It can also be gleaned from
the legislative history of the CVRA that the bill's sponsors intended the
statute to be a work in progress and that future amendments or clarifications
would likely be necessary."
78. Blondel, supranote 5, at 258.
79. See 150 CONG. REc. S4260-01, S4270 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) ("It is a tragic
reality that cases may involve multiple victims and yet that fact is not grounds for
eviscerating the rights in this bill. Rather that fact is grounds for the court to find an
alternative procedure to give effect to this bill.").
80. See id (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("A 'crime victim' is defined as a person directly
and proximately harmed as a result of a federal offense .... This is an intentionally broad
definition because all victims of crime deserve to have their rights protected, whether or not
they are the victim of the count charged.").
81. See id at S4264 ("[Tihe most frequent [circumstance) is: My mother was
murdered .. , and I could not attend the trial.... The other circustace... [is] where a
crime has been committed, the perpetrator has been convicted and is in prison or jail, but
unbeknown to the victim ... the individual gets out of jail."). It is also interesting to note
that every victim that the bill's sponsors invited to the floor debate was a surviving family
member of an individual who had been murdered. See id at S4260-0 1, S4265-66
(describing a victim whose wife was brutally murdered, a victim whose daughter was killed,
a victim whose son and brother were killed, and another victim whose daughter was raped
and murdered).
82. See Kyl et al., supra note 33, at 582-83 (describing how each victim listed in the
title of the CVRA was murdered).
83. See 150 CONG. R~c. S4260-01, S4272 (2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("Fortunately, however, this is to be a statute, not a constitutional amendment, and it can be
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B. Statutory Overview of the Crime Victims 'Rights Act
The CVRA defines a crime victim as "a person directly and
proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense. 04
The CVRA provides crime victims with eight rights.8
Of these rights,
"[t]he right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court
proceeding,"0 6 "[t]he right not to be excluded from any such public court
proceeding,"8 7 "[tlhe right to be reasonably heard at any public
proceeding,"'88 and "[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
Government in the case , 89 are among the most troubling in the prosecution
of environmental criminal defendants, as illustrated in Part IV.C. In
carrying out these rights, the CVRA charges the Department of Justice with
the duty of ensuring that crime victims are notified of the court proceedings
and afforded the rights provided in the Act.90 The CVRA anticipated cases
involving multiple crime victims and provided that "[iln a case where the
modified and improved. We will be able to make it better as we go along."); id. at S4271
("Over time, we will be able to modify and fine-tune the statute so that it provides an
appropriate degree of protection for the rights of crime victims."); id at S4271 ("In addition,
as Chief Justice Rehnquist and others have pointed out, statutes are more easily corrected if
we find, in hindsight, that they need correction, clarification, or improvement.").
84. 18 U.S.C. §3771(e) (2006).
85. See id. § 3771(a) (listing the eight rights that prosecutors must afford crime
victims during and after the trials of the accused). Subsection (a) of the CVRA lists crime
victims' rights as,
(1) the right to be reasonably protected from the accused; (2) the right to
reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding ...
involving the crime ... ; (3) the right not to be excluded from any such public
court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing
evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if
the victim heard other testimony at the proceeding; (4) the right to be reasonably
heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea,
sentencing, or any parole proceeding; (5) the reasonable right to confer with the
attorney for the Government in the case; (6) the right to full and timely
restitution as provided in law; (7) the right to proceedings free from
unreasonable delay; and (8) the right to be treated with fairness and with respect
for the victim's dignity and privacy.
Id
86. Id. § 3771(a)(2).
87. Id § 3771(a)(3).
88. Id. § 3771l(a)(4).
89. Id. § 3771l(a)(5).
90. See id. § 3771(c)(1) (stating that the Department of Justice and other agencies
"shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the
rights described in subsection (a)" of the CVRA).
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court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to
accord all of the crime victims the right described in subsection (a), the
court shall fashion a reasonable procedure ...that does not unduly
complicate or prolong the proceedings. "9 1 Since most environmental
criminal cases involve multiple crime victims, the courts hearing these
cases must parse through this language to develop a "reasonable
procedure."
In addition to the substantive rights granted to crime victims, a
frequently litigated issue relating to the CVRA concerns who qualifies as a
crime victim, which is defined in the CVRA as "a person directly and
proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an
offense in the District of Columbia."9 2 Due to the lack of guidance
provided in the CVRA's text regarding who qualifies as a victim, courts
considering the issue have been forced to look to case law concerning other
crime victims' rights statutes for assistance.9
C. Case Law Concerning the Crime Victims 'Rights Act
Since the enactment of the CVRA, more than fifty district and
appellate decisions have considered a wide range of issues regarding
victims' rights under the Act, such as "the definition of who is a 'victim';
rights to information and notice; rights to confer, be present, and be heard;
rights to restitution; and the rights to fairness, respect, dignity, and
privacy."9 4 Many of these cases interpreting the CVRA involve underlying
95
offenses related to drugs, fraud, or murder.

Id. § 3771(d)(2).
Id § 3771(e).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Ati. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460
(D.N.J. 2009) ("[Olne of the chief sponsors of the bill, Sen. John Kyl, has explained that 'the
CVRA's definition of a crime victim is based on the federal restitution statutes,' citing the
Victim and Witness Protect Act ... and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.. ..
94. Boland & Butler, supra note 2, at 8-9.
95. See Starr et al., A New Intersection, supra note 10, at 41 ('Many of the relatively
few judicial decisions analyzing the CVRA over the past four years have arisen in the
context of drug, fraud, and murder cases, involving a discrete universe of victims.").
91.
92.
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1. Defining a Crime Victim Under the CVRA

Perhaps the most troubling and time-consuming issue concerning the
application of the CYRA to victims of environmental crimes is determining
whether a victim was directly and proximately harmed such that he or she
has standing under the CVRA. In United States v. Atlantic States Cast Iron
Pipe Co. ,96 an industrial company operating a cast iron pipe foundry in New
Jersey and four of its supervisor-level employees were convicted of
conspiring to violate the CWA and CAA and obstructing proceedings
conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
after several employees "sustained serious or fatal injuries at work." 97 The
issue before the district court was whether the "six individuals, [who were]
employees who sustained serious or fatal injuries at work during the
relevant period, qualify as crime victims under the CVRA because of the
OSHA-related convictions in the case."9 8 To answer this question, the
district court focused on the definition of a victim under the CVRA. 99 The
district court noted that the legislative history on the meaning of the term
was scant, but that the definition of a crime victim in the CVRA was based
on the definition of a crime victim in the Victim and Witness Protection Act
(VWPA) and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA)'0 0 Thus, the
district court decided to utilize the definition of a crime victim provided in
these statutes to aid its interretation. 10 1 The definition of a crime victim in
these statutes is:
[A] person directly and proximately harmed as
commission of an offense for which restitution
including, in the case of an offense that involves
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity,

a result of the
may be ordered,
as an element a
a person directly

96. Atd. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d at 545-46 (holding that the
individuals at question did not qualify as crime victims under the CVRA).
97. Id. at 455-56.
98. Id at 457.
99. See id. at 460-73 (exploring the definition of a victim under the CVRA).
100. See id at 460 (noting how Senator Kyl, a co-sponsor of the bill, stated that the
definition of a crime victim was based on these acts); see also id. at 534 ("[jI]t is clear that
the definitions of 'victim' under the CVRA, the MyRA, and the VWPA have been aligned
by Congress to identify a common core group of persons who have powerful and
enforceable rights under those statutes.").
101. See id. at 462 ("The Court is of the view that based on the text, origin and limited
legislative history of the CVRA[,] ... the definition of 'victim' under CVRA will be
interpreted consistent with existing and evolving case law under the VWPA and MYRA.").
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criminal conduct in the course of the scheme,
harmed by the defendant's
1 02
conspiracy or pattern.

The court found that the term "directly and proximately harmed"
serves a two-fold purpose. "First, it defines who qualifies as a 'victim'
under the statute. Second, it provides a rule for determining what losses
may be claimed as restitution; i.e., only those losses 'directly and
proximately' caused by defendant's criminal conduct."103 The main issue
was whether the conspiracy to evade the CAA, CWA, and OSHA was the
direct and proximate cause of the injuries to the victims.104 The prosecution
argued that "the continuing deception of OSHA not only involved the
coverup after the injuries but in large measure was responsible for the
injuries themselves."' 0 5 The court noted that the CVRA
instructs the district court to look at the offense itself only to determine
the harmful effects the offense has on parties... . [A] party may qualify
as a victim, even though it may not have been the target of the crime, as
long as it suffers harm as a result of the crime's commission.10
Despite this broad interpretation of a crime victim, the court still held
that the six employees injured during the proscribed conspiracy period were
The court found that only OSHA
not crime victims under the CVRA .
was directly and proximately harmed by the conspiracy because the
conspiracy began after the victims in question were injured. 108 Extending
victim status to the victims in this case "would likely require notice to all
Atlantic States workers, and all contractors' workers, injured at the facility
during the alleged conspiracy period." 09 The court noted that "[tlhe
conduct that allegedly harmed one or more of the six named workers may
have been in violation of OSHA workplace standards .. . , and that appears
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (2006).
103. United States v. Atd. States Cast iron Pipe Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d 453, 470 (D.N.J.
2009).
104. See id at 532 ("Thle issue that requires resolution in this opinion is whether the six
named workers, or their representatives, have statutory crime victim status under the
CVRA.").
105. Idat 542.
106. Id at 535-36 (quoting In re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11 th Cir. 2008)).
107. See id. at 532 ("We hold that, in this case, the six named workers are not statutory
crime victims under the CVRA of the offenses of conviction.").
108. See id at 541-42 ("Each of the substantive convictions, against only particular
defendants, was an obstruction or false statement during the OSHA investigation after the
worker in question had been injured.").
109. Idat 543.
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0
to be the actual basis of the government's argument in this motion.'""
Nevertheless, the court found that "[s]uch conduct ... was not conduct
proscribed by the obstruction and false statement substantive offenses and
conspiracy objectives of which each of these defendants was convicted, and
we perceive no 'direct and proximate' causal link between those offenses of
conviction and the injuries sustained by the six named workers.""' This
case highlights the lack of guidance that Congress provided for courts to
determine who qualifies as a crime victim and therefore the difficulty the
courts have in determining which individuals are directly and proximately
harmed by a federal offense such that they obtain victim status under the
CVRA.
A Texas district court case involving the leakage of emissions from a
CITGO refinery also recently considered the definition of a crime victim
under the CVRA.' 2 In this case, CITGO was "convicted of two felony
counts for operating two tanks as oil/water separators without the required
emission control equipment in violation of the CAA.""' At the trial,
witnesses testified that they could smell emissions from the tanks in the
surrounding community."14 At issue in this case was what is necessary for a
victim to be found directly and proximately harmed by the leak.' ~The
prosecution argued that the victims in question "suffered one or more of the
following adverse health effects: burning eyes, burning nose, sore throat,
burning lungs, dizziness, vomiting, nausea, fatigue, headaches and skin
rahs'16 after the chemical leak and "that the symptoms experienced by
the victim/witnesses are precisely the type of adverse health effects one
would suffer if exposed to chemicals."' 17 Defense counsel, on the other
hand, argued that these symptoms "are compatible with a wide array of
other causes, including allergies, asthma, bacterial infections and viral

110. Idat 545.
111. Id
112. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., Cr. No. C-06-563, 2007 WL 4577400
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2007).
113. Starr et al., A New Intersection, supra note 10, at 43.
114. Id.
115. See id. ("In such a case, will every resident who could smell the odors in the
surrounding area of the refinery be a 'victim' under the CVRA with respect to the CAA
criminal violation, or will some additional injury be required?").
116. Response of the United States to CITGO's Memorandum in Support of its Motion
to Exclude the Testimony of the Alleged Victims at 2, United States v. CITGO Petroleum
Corp., Cr. No. C-06-563 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2007), 2008 WL 3433352 [hereinafter
Response of United States to CITGO].
117. Id. at 3.
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infections. There is simply no evidence that such symptoms were caused
by chemical exposure in this case; in fact, . . . not a single witness was
diagnosed with chemical exposure by their treating physician."' 18 Defense
counsel also noted that the emissions might have come ftrm a source other
than the two tanks under investigation. "9 Thus, the defense believed that
"[tlhe government is left with nothing beyond subjective and unsupported
'beliefs' that the witnesses' complained of symptoms were caused by
CITGO's Tanks 116 and 117."910 Therefore, the court must determine
whether merely smelling the gas is enough to qualify an individual as a
victim, or if some further damage must be demonstrated to gain victim
status under the CVRA. The Texas district court has not ruled on whether
any individual who smelled the leak obtains crime victim status or if
proving some further injury is necessary. 1 In any event, it is important to
note, "an unintended consequence of the CVRA may be a significant delay
122
in proceeding to sentencing and final resolution of the criminal matter"
while the district court considers questions like~ these.
In United States v. WR. Grace,123 the district court reviewed the
question of whether individuals exposed to asbestos were proximately
harmed such that they had standing under the CVRA.124 In this case, the
government's indictment charged W.R. Grace and seven of its executives
with criminal conduct arising out of its vermiculite operation in Libby,
Montana. 12 5 Among the charges were conspiring "knowingly to release
118. CITGO's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Exclude the Testimony
of the Alleged Victims at 2, United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., Crim. No. CR-06-563
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2007), 2008 WL 3924711 [hereinafter CITGO's Reply Memorandum].
119. See id. ("[Cloncluding that two tanks within all of refinery row were the only
possible source of emissions belies logic, common sense and the government's own
evidence. For instance, . . . reports conclusively establish that the amount of benzene
recorded did not change whether or not Tanks 116 and 117 were. ...measured. ....
120. Id. at 6.
12 1. See Starr et al., A New Intersection, supra note 10, at 43 ("As of this writing, the
district court has not yet set a sentencing date and the parties have filed additional briefs on
the causation issue (i.e., whether CITGO's conduct was the direct and proximate cause of
the harm suffered by the victims).").
122. Id.
123. See United States v. W.R. Grace, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1166 (D. Mont. 2009),
vacated, 2009 WL 5697923 (D. Mont. Feb. 27, 2009) (holding that there were no
identifiable victims with the right to participate under the CVRA).
124. Id
125. See United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745, 749 (9th Cir. 2007) ("From 1963
until the early 1990s, W.R. Grace. ...mined and processed . . . vermiculite ore outside of
Libby, Montana. In response to ongoing serious health problems suffered by Libby
residents, the government obtained an indictment charging W.R. Grace and seven of its
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asbestos, a hazardous air pollutant, into the ambient air, thereby knowingly
26
placing persons in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury."'1
Given the difficulty in determining who has been exposed to asbestos and at
what levels, it was uncertain at the time of trial who was proximately
harmed to qualify as a victim under the Act.'127 The district court found that
there were no identifiable victims as defined by the CVRA. 128 However, on
appeal, the Ninth Circuit instructed the district court to vacate its decision,
finding that "[tlhe district court erred in denying petitioners' motions to
accord rights to victim-witnesses based on its finding that the thirty-four
victim-witnesses identified by the United States as prospective victims do
not meet the meaning of 'crime victim' set forth in the Crime Victims'
Rights Act."'129 These cases illustrate the difficult inquiry courts must
undertake at the beginning of environmental criminal cases to identify
which individuals qualify as victims under the CVRA and how subsequent
appeals of these decisions can lead to extensive delays in the criminal
proceedings.
2. Other Ramifications of the CVRA on Environmental Criminal
Prosecutions
In addition to the problem of attempting to identify which individuals
are victims in an environmental criminal case, there are many other
obstacles that must be overcome during the criminal proceedings. The first
case that examined the rights of victims of environmental crimes under the
CVRA involved an explosion at a Texas oil refinery owned and operated by
BP Products North America, Inc. that resulted in fifteen people dying and
over 170 suffering physical injury.'130 Following internal investigations by
executives .. , with criminal conduct arising from Grace's vermiculite operation. . ...
126. Id
127. See Opening Brief of the United States and Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 10,
United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-30472, 06-30524), 2007
WL 984191, at *10 ("[Mlore victims are expected to be discovered in the years to come due
to the long delay that frequently occurs between exposure and the manifestation of
symptoms.").
128. See United States v. W.R. Grace, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1166 (D. Mont. 2009),
vacated, 2009 WL 5697923 (D. Mont. 2009) ('[T1here are no identifiable victims, as the Act
defines them, of the federal offenses alleged in the Superseding Indictment.").
129. In re Parker, Nos. 09-70529, 09-70533, 2009 WL 5609734, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 27,
2009).
130. United States v. BP Prods. N. Am., No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 501321, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 21, 2008).
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BP and investigations by the federal government, over four thousand claims
were filed on behalf of the victims and their families.'13 ' Half of these
32
claims settled for over $1.6 billion.1
In addition to these civil suits, the federal government also initiated a
two-year criminal investigation against BP, which culminated in BP
pleading guilty to violating the Clean Air Act, being placed on probation
for three years, 3 and paying a $50 million fine, 3 the largest criminal fine
ever assessed for a CAA violation135 and the most significant criminal
offense that could be charged.13 6 Notably, the federal government, with
permission from the district court judge, did not notify the victims in the
case about the proposed plea agreement until after it was reached, stating
"the large number of victims in the case [and] . .. extensive press coverage
of the explosion and subsequent events" 13 would likely prejudice BP if it
38
was learned that it was negotiating a plea agreement.'
When the prosecution announced the plea agreement to the public and
set a date for a hearing on the proposed agreement, several of the victims of
the accident appealed to the trial court, asking it to reject the proposed plea
agreement for violating, among other things, the victims' rights under the

13 1. Id.
13 2. Id.
133. See Government's Response to Victim's Brief at 9-10, United States v. BP Prods.
N. Am., No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 501321 (S.D. Tex. Feb 21, 2008) (4:07-cr-00434)
[hereinafter Government's Response to Victims Brief] ("The conditions of probation are
designed to protect the public from further crimes by BP resulting from violations regarding
process safety because they specifically address BP's criminal conduct that caused the ...
explosion that resulted in the deaths of 15 employees and injuries of at least 170
employees."). BP's probation required that it "implement numerous process safety and
environmental improvements at its Texas City Refinery, at significant cost to BP." Starr et
al., A New Intersection, supra note 10, at 42.
134. See id. at *3 ("On October 24, 2007, the United States and BP Products signed a
plea agreement ....
[P]lead[ing] guilty to a criminal information charging it with two
violations of the Clean Air Act,. .. [Requiring it] to pay a $50 million fine and to be
placed on supervised release for three years.").
135. Starr et al., A New Intersection,supra note 10, at 41.
136. See United States v. BP Prods. N. Am., No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 501321, at *5
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008) ("[T]he victims acknowledged that BP Products had pleaded
guilty to the most significant criminal offense that could be charged.").
137. Idat*1.
138. See id. at *2 ("Any suggestion of an admission of criminal responsibility by BP
Products North America, Inc., prior to the actual signing of a plea agreement would serve to
prejudice BP ... and could impair the plea negotiation process and may prejudice the case in
the event that no plea is reached.").
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CVRA. 3 9 In particular, the victims alleged four violations of the CVRA
had occurred "stemming from the government's motion to defer notifying
the victims of the proposed plea agreement until after the negotiations had
40

concluded."1

In defense of its decision not to notify the victims of the plea
agreement, the prosecution noted that "[tlhe CVRA is silent on when notice
of plea negotiations is appropriate" 14'1 and "[g]iven the absence of specific
statutory language mandating victim consultation in advance of the
plea[,... the government's obligation to confer [with the victims] on the
possible details of the plea agreement was not 'clear and indisputable' [such
While the district court
that the Court of Appeals may intervene] ."4
rejected the victims' claim that the ex parte proceeding violated their rights
under the CVRA, the Fifth Circuit disagreed.14 1 Specifically, the appellate
court found that the number of victims in this case, two hundred, was not so
large as to make it impracticable for the prosecutors to notify them
regarding the proposed plea agreement.'"4 Furthermore, the appellate court
stated that potential media bias was not a valid reason to circumvent the
requirements of the CVRA.145 This ruling by the appellate panel struck a
blow to the rights of environmental criminal defendants. Given the number
139. See id at *5 ("[T]he victims focused on three challenges: the fine was too low; the
probation conditions were too lenient; arnd certain CVRA requirements had been violated.").
140. Id. at *6. The specific allegations were: the ex parte procedure was not authorized
by the CVRA and it violated the victims' rights; even if the ex parte procedure was
authorized, there was no "adequate factual information" to support total deprivation of the
victims' rights; the ex parte procedure should have been disclosed to the victims as soon as
the need for it disappeared; and "[tlhe use of the ex pante procedure violated the victims'
right to confer about the plea bargain and the plea bargain reached by the government should
therefore be rejected." Id.
141. Government's Surreply to Victim's Reply to Government's Response to Victim's
Motion Filed Pursuant to the Crime Victims Rights Act at 5, United States v. BP Prods. N.
Am., No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 501321 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008) (4:07-cr-00434)
[hereinafter Government's Surreply to Victim's Reply].
142. Government's Response to Victim's Brief, supra note 133, at 3.
143. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) ("With due respect for the district
court's diligent efforts to do justice, we conclude that, under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, it was contrary to the provisions of the CVRA for the court to
permit and employ the exparte proceedings that have taken place. .. )
144. See id at 395 ("[W]here there were fewer than two hundred victims, all of whom
could be easily reached, it is not reasonable to say that notification and inclusion were
'impracticable.' . . . [jN]otification itself would [not] have been too cumbersome, timeconsumning, or expensive .... ".).
145. See id. ("In passing the Act, Congress made the policy decision-which we are
bound to enforce-that the victims have a right to inform the plea negotiation process by
conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached.").
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of victims in the BP case and the amount of publicity surrounding the
accident, it is unlikely that many prosecutors will be able to circumvent the
146
required procedures of the CVRA under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation.
V. Where Does This Leave Us?
A. Determining Congress's Intent
On balance, it seems unlikely that Congress intended for the CVRA to
be used against corporate defendants in environmental criminal cases. The
Task Force's report on violations of crime victims' rights focused on
victims of the most egregious violent crimes. 44' The Judiciary Committee
Report on the proposed constitutional amendment focused exclusively on
the stories of victims of violent crimes without so much as mentioning
The constitutional amendment originally
environmental crimes.148
proposed to protect crime victims encompassed only victims of violent
crimes.'14 9 The importance of the proposed constitutional amendment's
particular focus is highlighted by Congress's quick transition from
constitutional amendment to statute and the similarities in language and
structure between the proposed amendment and the CVRA. 5 0 Similarly,
the legislative history of the CVRA also indicates the sponsors' focus on
victims of violent crimes. The CVRA's namesake includes only victims of
violent crimes and the floor statements for the CVRA focused exclusively
on victims of violent crimes, without mentioning victims of environmental
crimes. 151 Taken together, a clear pattern emerges, indicating that Congress
146. See Starr et al., A New Intersection, supra note 10, at 42 ("[Tjhe assertion of
CVRA rights by victims of the BP explosion proves that the statute has the potential to
dramatically change the manner in which environmental crimes are prosecuted and the
ability of prosecutors and defendants to resolve such charges through plea agreements.").
147. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the Task Force's
Report focused on victims of violent crimes).
148. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing some of the most egregious
examples of victims of violent crimes being shut out of the court proceedings).
149. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining how the constitutional
amendment would only protect certain victims of violent crimes).
150. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (describing how the CVRA was a
response of the proposed constitutional amendment failing to pass and how the CVRA
sought to accomplish the same goals intended by the amendment).
151. See supra notes 8 1-82 and accompanying text (recounting the floor statements of
Senators Kyl and Feinstein, co-sponsors of the CVRA, which focused exclusively on victims
of violent crimes).
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did not intend for the CVRA to be used by victims of environmental crimes.
While scholars disagree over the application and usefulness of legislative
intent, 152 nevertheless, statutes "are directives from the legislature that We
the People have elected and that our Constitution has charged with issuing
such directives. [Thus, it seems appropriate that] [c]itizens, agencies, and
judges should .. . also apply those directives in a manner consistent with
While Congress's intent is not
the expectations of their authors."'
of whether the CVRA should
the
matter
on
necessarily determinative
encompass victims of environmental crimes, it is a factor that should be
considered in any analysis. Because it is evident that Congress did not
originally anticipate for victims of environmental crimes to utilize the
CVRA, the next question is whether the Act should be amended to reflect
this intent.
B. Determining Who Qualifes as a Victim
1. How to Define Harm
The CVRA arose as a result of victims' rights advocates and Congress
recognizing the harm that the criminal justice system imparted on crime
Victims. 154

While widespread recognition of this harm arose recently,

determining who has been "harmed" by a particular act is not a new inquiry.
John Stuart Mill examined the issue in his essay, On Liberty,' in which he
in interfering with
stated "the sole end for which mankind are warranted. ...
the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection... . [Tihe
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
56
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."'
Legal philosophers used Mill's theory, known as the "harm principle," from
1960-1980 to justify when the government could enforce certain moral
152.

See, e.g., Patricia Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in

the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68

IOWA L. REv.

195. 214 (1983) ("[C]onsistent and uniform

rules for statutory construction and use of legislative materials are not being followed today.
It sometimes seems that citing legislative history is still, as my late colleague Harold
Leventhal once observed, akin to 'looking over a crowd and picking out your friends."').

153.

WILiAm

N.

ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

222 (2d ed. 2006).
154. See supra Part III (describing the historical context of the emergence of the
CVRA).

155.

JOH-N STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY

156.

Id. at 9.

(Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859).
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behavior on its citizens. 1 17 In addition to being used by legal philosophers,
the harm principle spilled over into criminal law scholarship and the
rhetoric of criminal law itself.'
During this period, "[tlhe harm principle
was used to exclude certain categories of activities from legal
enforcement"159 and to classify other crimes that should be punished. 6 0 For
instance, "[uln the case of prostitution, the drafters retained the criminal
sanction specifically because of the potential harm in the spread of syphilis
and gonorrhea.. .. [However,] [i]n the case of consensual homosexual
activity, the drafters rejected criminal responsibility on the ground of lack
6

of harm."'1 1
Over time, the harm principle evolved, leading legal scholars and
legislators to punish behavior that previously went unpunished.
Today,... harm is no longer ...a necessary condition because nontrivial harm arguments are..,. made about practically every moral
offense. As a result,.... we no longer focus on the existence or nonon the types of harm, the amounts
existence of harm. Instead, we focus
62
of harms, and the balance of harms.'1
In determining which harms should be regulated, "it is the legislator
himself, using his own fallible judgment rather than spurious formulas and
'measurements,' who must compare conflicting interests and judge which
are most important.0 6 3 This new interpretation of the harm principle is
used to "justify laws against prostitution, pornography, public drinking,
drugs, and loitering, as well as regulation of homosexual and heterosexual
conduct, on the basis of harm to others."'64 For instance, proponents of
pornography regulation and prohibition focus on the harm pornography
157.

See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. GRIM. L. &
131 (1999) ("Gradually, over the course of the 1960s, '70's, and '80's,

CIMINOLOGY 109,

Mill's famous sentence began to dominate the legal philosophic debate over the enforcement
of morality. Harm became the critical principle used to police the line between law and
morality within Anglo-American philosophy of law.").
158. See id at 137-39 ("Most of the leading criminal law scholars either adopted the
harm principle or incorporated it in their writings. ... The harm principle was also reflected
in the definition of crimes, especially moral offenses and public decency crimes [in the
Model Penal Code].").
159. Id. atl114.
160. See id. at 139 ("With regard to each moral offense, the drafters specifically
discussed harm.").
16 1. Id
162. Id.
163. Id. at 182.
164. Id at 139.
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causes to "the women who are used to make the pornographic
material[,. .. the women who are assaulted by consumers of
pornography[, and the fact that it] ... supports and promotes a general
climate of discrimination against women."16 5 These harms must be
balanced with the harms created by the regulation of pornography, namely
66
restrictions on free speech.1
2. Balancingthe Interests: The Problems Createdby Defining
a Victim Broadly
In essence, the CVRA is the product of legislators balancing various
harms. Victims' rights advocates noted the harm caused to victims who
167
were frequently shut out of the criminal proceedings of the accused.
Until recently, legislators likely thought that the possible harms that might
result from granting victims' expanded rights, such as the defendant's right
to a fair trial and the added financial and time burden on the prosecution
(which consequently harms the public), outweighed the harm caused to
victims. After decades of lobbying by crime victims' rights advocates,
Congress finally decided that the harm to victims outweighed the potential
harm to the defendant and the criminal justice system.168 Thus, it can be
seen that affording crime victims greater rights is not simply a matter of
recognizing that they have been left out of the legal process in the past. It is
important to consider all of the interests at stake, including the rights of the
defendant, the victim, and the public, when crafting a solution.
It is evident that the application of the CVRA to environmental
criminal cases causes a flurry of potentially significant problems for
defendants and prosecutors. Most prominently, in many environmental
criminal cases, it is difficult to determine who is a victim. 169 The nature of
these cases often makes it impossible for prosecutors to identify who the

165. Idat 141.
166. See id. ("The 'appropriate liberal response' to pornography today, I would suggest,
is the free speech argument-not the harm principle.").
167. See supra Part IIIA (discussing the reasons behind the emergence of the Crime
Victims' Rights Movement).
168. See supra Part JIIIB (discussing several of the statutes which Congress passed in
order to secure crime victims greater rights).
169. See supra Part IV.C. 1 (providing examples in various cases in which the courts
struggle to define who qualifies as a victim to receive the protections provided for in the
CVRA).
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victims are.170 Difficulty in identifying who qualifies as a victim in turn
results in significant delays in the prosecution.'17 ' Mini-trials must be held
to decide who qualifies as a victim under the CVRA, placing a substantial
financial and time burden on the DOJ and, ironically, violating one of the
protections afforded under the CVRA, namely, "the right to proceedings
free from unreasonable delay."'172 Involving victims in the process also
hinders the DOJ's ability to secure plea agreements with corporate
defendants, which it has traditionally relied on to encourage cooperation
with corporate defendants.173 Plea agreements are an integral aspect of the
criminal justice system, since state and federal prosecutors simply do not
have the resources to try every case they receive. 174 Inclusion of crime
victims in environmental criminal cases will also likely lead to significant
delays in the prosecution once the crime victims are identified.175 In
addition to delays, victim participation in environmental criminal cases may
also lead to discrimination against the defendant, as noted by the prosecutor
in United States v. BP Products North America because these cases are
likely to attract substantial media attention. 176 Finally, the CVRA may
inhibit the success of the EPA's Voluntary Disclosure Policy, which plays
an important role in the prosecution of environmental violations by

170. See, e.g., supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty
involved in identifying the victims of an asbestos leak because the symptoms occur over an
extended period of time and are often difficult to differentiate from symptoms of other
illnesses).
171. See Starr et al., A New Intersection, supra note 10, at 49 ("Moreover, CITGO
reveals that the CVRA will most likely lead to further litigation during the sentencing phase
of the prosecution over who is a 'crime victim."'1).
172. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7) (2006).
173. See Starr et al., A New Intersection, supra note 10, at 49 ("in the context of
prosecutions for environmental crimes, [thwarting the plea agreement process] ... would be
a great loss to society as a whole. It would risk not only the guaranteed, if limited, victory
for the government, but also the resources saved by avoiding litigaion. .. .").
174. See GEORGE R. DEKLE, SR., PROSECUTION PRINCIPLES: A CLINICAL HANDBOOK 66
(Thomson/West 2007) ("[B]y the early 1980's ... prosecutors were regularly making plea
offers to the defense. Whether plea offers by the prosecution are advisable or inadvisable,
laudable or blameworthy, they are a fact of life in the modem courtroom.").
175. See Starr et al., A New Intersection, supra note 10, at 49 ("[D~elay will be
inevitable in environmental criminal cases with many victims who assert the CVRA in either
opposing a plea agreement or advocating their rights during the sentencing phase of the
trial.").
176. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing the bias that might
occur as a result of letting victims speak at the sentencing of a major environmental criminal
defendant).
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encouraging companies to voluntarily disclose them.' Under the CVRA's
current construction and interpretation, these flaws could potentially grow
as more victims begin using the CVRA to participate in the cases of
environmental criminal defendants. Given the problems created by the
current construction of the CVRA and the potential for these problems to
grow, serious consideration should be given to amending the CVRA in
order to better balance the harms to victims, the public, and defendants.
C Possible Solutions
I have identified three potential solutions to the problems created by
the CVRA for environmental criminal prosecutions: leave the CVRA alone
or tweak it; limit the number of victims who may participate in an
environmental criminal prosecution; or exclude all victims of
environmental crimes from the rights provided by the CVRA. Adopting
any of these solutions necessarily requires that the various harms, namely
the harm to the victim, the harm to the defendant, and the harm to the
public, be re-allocated appropriately. The preferred solution ultimately
comes down to a preference as to which harms should, be prevented.
1. Leave It Alone or Tweak It
As currently constructed, the CVRA allows prosecutors and judges to
decide whether to provide victims of environmental crimes with rights
under the Act on a case-by-case basis.178 The most prominent benefit here
is the amount of flexibility that it provides. This method allows for the
court to weigh the various harms in a given case and then fashion a
reasonable solution that balances these harms in an appropriate manner. In
theory, adopting a case-by-case approach allows for victims to participate
in certain cases when the court feels it would not unduly harm the
defendant or burden the prosecution. In reality, courts are reluctant to bar
victims from the criminal proceedings of environmental criminals even

177. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (describing the importance of the
EPA's Voluntary Disclosure Policy in securing voluntary disclosures of environmental
violations from corporations).
178. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (describing how the CVRA allows the
court to prescribe a reasonable procedure when the number of victims involved makes it
impracticable to afford all of the rights outlined in the CVRA).
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where there is a chance that failing to do so will impede plea bargaining or
179
prejudice the defendant.

In this solution, all of the harm is allocated to the defendant and the
public, with the victim assuming none of the harm.1 80 While this approach
is likely palatable to many, particularly crime victims' rights advocates, it is
important to note that at the time victims are identified under the CVRA,
the defendant has not yet been convicted. 8 1 Although the evidence in
many cases might indicate that the defendant is guilty, an important aspect
of the criminal justice system is innocent until proven guilty and it therefore
seems unfair for the defendant to assume all of the harm.182 Given the
noted harms to environmental criminal defendants created by the current
interpretation of the CVRA, this approach seems unjust. Thus, there is
likely a better solution that more adequately addresses the problems created
by the current construction of the CVRA.
Another maj or criticism of the CVRA is that it lacks any guidance on
how prosecutors and courts should go about providing victims with the
rights described in the Act.18 ' Although the CVRA allows courts to fashion
179. See supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing how the Fifth Circuit in United States v. BP
Products North America determined that notifying and including 200 victims in the plea
bargaining process was not impracticable).
180. The harm assumed by the defendant and the public includes prejudice to the
defendant, delays in the criminal proceedings, and the hindering of plea agreements upon
which the DOJ often relies. See Starr et al., A New Intersection, supra note 10, at 49
("[W]here a large number of victims are given notification of and access to complex and
fragile negotiations, negative publicity may combine with a drawn-out timetable to thwart a
plea agreement."); supra note 171 and accompanying text (suggesting that delay is inevitable
if the CVRA is applied to environmental criminal prosecutions); supra note 173 and
accompanying text (discussing how the CVRA could hinder the negotiation of plea
agreements with environmental criminal defendants).
181. See United States v. W.R. Grace, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1161 (D. Mont. 2009),
vacated, 2009 WL 5697923 (D. Mont. Feb. 27, 2009) ("Whether there are crime victims
under the Act does not depend on whether the person the government has accused of
committing a federal offense is innocent or guilty."); see also id. ("That syllogism-which
renders the CVRA inapplicable to this or any other criminal case unless and until the
defendant is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-produces an absurd result that I must
presume Congress did not intend."). In determining whether a victim was proximately or
directly harmed by the accused, it is irrelevant whether or not the accused is eventually
convicted, because the outcome of the trial does not affect the status of the victim.
182. See Sierra Elizabeth, The Newest Spectator Sport. Why Extending Victims' Rights
to the Spectators' Gallery Erodes the Presumption of Innocence, 58 DUKE L.J. 275, 275
(2008) ("A criminal defendant in the United States is innocent until proven guilty and has a
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trail and an impartial jury.").
183. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing how the CVRA provides
broad, sweeping rights without any indication of how these rights should actually be
implemented).
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a "reasonable procedure" when multiple victims are involved,' 84 it provides
no guidance on how to do so. 185 As seen in United States v. BP Products
North America, discussed in Part IV.C.2, without any guidance on how to
implement the victims' rights, some courts have interpreted this flexibility
narrowly, tying the prosecutor's hands and leaving him little discretion to
weigh the various harms in cases involving multiple, unidentifiable
victims. 8 6

Also absent from the CVRA are any protections afforded to

which suggests that the rights of defendants were an
defendants,'
afterthought in the construction of the CVRA. Therefore, it is not even
apparent from the text of the CVRA that a reasonable procedure entails
protecting a defendant's rights.188 To remedy this situation, Congress could
amend the CVRA to specifically state that the extension of victims' rights
shall in no case infringe upon a defendant's rights. A trial judge could then
use a weighing test to properly distribute the harms to ensure that victim
involvement will not harm the defendant or the public.
Despite the merits of this tweaking of the CVRA, it would likely result
in the continued delay of criminal proceedings of environmental criminals,
since it is inevitable that extensive litigation would continue to occur to
determine whether an individual should be given victim status and how
much participation should be allowed. 189 These delays would also likely
lead to continued media attention, which may prejudice the defendant and
thwart a plea agreement. Thus, despite its merits, this solution would
probably continue to cause the same problems inherent in the current
system, distributing the brunt of the harm on the public and the defendant.

184. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2) (2006) ('In a case where the court finds that the
number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the crime victims the rights
described in subsection (a), the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to
this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings.").
185. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that the CVRA fails to articulate
how the rights it provides should be implemented).
186. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (rejecting the prosecution's bid to
wait until after the plea agreement was in place to inform the victims).
187. In the CVRA, "the accused" is mentioned only twice and in neither case does it
suggest that the accused has any rights. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) ("A crime victim has the
following rights: (1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused. (2) The right to
reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding ...involving the
crime or of any release or escape of the accused.").
188. Id.
189. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing how determining who is a
"crime victim" causes delays in the criminal prosecution).
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2. Limit the Number of Victims of Environmental Crimes Who May
ParticipateUnder the CVRA4
An alternative to the case-by-case approach would be to establish a
bright line test limiting the number of victims who may participate in an
environmental criminal case. In a case where the number of victims
exceeds this limit, only a certain number of victims would be allowed to
participate under the CVRA. While this solution might deny victims' rights
in particular situations, its simplicity would reduce delays in the criminal
proceedings since the number of participating victims would be limited.
This solution also allows for victims to participate in the criminal
proceedings without causing much harm to the defendant. With only a few
victims, it is not too burdensome for the prosecutor to coordinate with the
victims, and the case is also less likely to draw intense media attention that
might prejudice the defendant.
The biggest obstacle with this solution is determining the number of
victims that may participate in an environmental criminal case. In order to
come up with an appropriate solution, extensive consultation with
prosecutors at the DOJ, defense attorneys, judges, and victims' rights
activists should be conducted. These parties could look at case law
governing the CVRA and similar statutes, such as the VWPA and MVRA,
to identify the number of victims that have previously been permitted to
participate in criminal proceedings. Other factors that could be considered
are the possible burden on the prosecution and the potential for prejudice
against the defendant.
Unfortunately, under this solution the question of who qualifies as a
victim in an environmental criminal case must still be determined. Thus,
while delays in the sentencing and plea agreement phases would likely be
reduced under this solution, separate "mini-trials" would still be necessary
to determine who qualifies as a victim. Additionally, if the number of
victims exceeds the cap, the prosecution then must determine which of the
victims will be allowed to participate and which victims will be denied. It
is also possible that even if the number of victims allowed to participate in
the trial is capped, prejudice to the defendant might still result in certain
situations. So despite the fact that the defendant and the public bear less
harm in this solution than currently, the burden borne by the defendant and
the public still outweighs the victim's burden.
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3. Exclude All Victims ofEnvironmental Crimesfrom the CVRA
By now it should be apparent that in order to avoid the inefficiencies
and prejudice to the defendant caused by the CVRA in environmental
criminal cases, a more radical approach is necessary. Therefore, the most
viable option is to develop a bright line test that categorically excludes all
victims of environmental crimes from the CVRA. The most compelling
attribute of this bright line test is its simplicity. Once a case is identified as
involving an environmental crime, little additional analysis is needed,
which saves the public time and money. This solution also eliminates any
potential harm that might result to environmental criminal defendants, since
victims will be given no rights to participate in the criminal proceedings.
To implement this solution effectively, Congress should amend the
CVRA to exclude victims of environmental crimes. Congress passed the
CVRA as a statute-as opposed to a constitutional amendment-because
its members anticipated that statutory amendments would be necessary at
some point in the future, so it makes sense that Congress should affect this
change. 19 0 A statutory amendment also seems logical because the CVRA is
being amended in part to reflect its legislative intent. While this solution
does indeed seem radical at first blush, excluding all victims of
environmental crimes seems appropriate as Congress likely did not
originally intend for the CVRA to apply to victims of environmental
crimes. 191 Given the unique characteristics that distinguish environmental
190. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing how the proposed
constitutional amendment to secure victims' rights was eventually tabled because a statute
would allow Congress to amend the statute if it was eventually deemed necessary).
191. See supra Part V.A (discussing how Congress focused on victims of violent crimes
when constructing the CVRA). Another variation of this solution would be to limit the
application of the CVRA to victims of violent crimes. This seems logical since the
constitutional amendment originally proposed, before Congress resorted to passing the
CVRA instead, was designed to protect only victims of violent crimes, and the legislative
history regarding the CVRA focused entirely on victims of violent crimes. See supra note
66 and accompanying text (explaining how the proposed constitutional amendment extended
protections only to victims of violent crimes); supra Part V.A (describing how the CVRA
was named after four murder victims, and the floor statements of the co-sponsors of the
CVRA focused on victims of violent crimes). If Congress's intent was for the CVRA to
apply only to victims of violent crimes, perhaps it would be best to amend the Act so that it
more accurately reflects this intent, as opposed to merely excluding victims of
environmental crimes. However, this Note does not focus on other nonviolent crimes and it
is uncertain what impact this change would have. In any event, it is important to remember
that certain characteristics of environmental law distinguish it from other areas of the law.
See supra Part II.B (describing specific traits that differentiate environmental law from other
disciplines). Thus, despite Congress's intent for the CVRA to apply only to victims of
violent crimes, there is added justification to exclude victims of environmental crimes.
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law from other areas of the law,192 it seems natural to carve out an
exception to the CVRA.
Despite its benefits, this approach assigns most of the harm to one
party, the victim. Consequently, this solution will likely draw the ire of
victims' rights advocates, who will argue that it is unjustifiable to tell a
victim that while he ordinarily would have the right to participate in the
criminal proceedings because he was the victim of an environmental crime,
he has no right to participate. Unfortunately, the adoption of any of the
solutions in this Note will result in one party assuming more harm than the
others.' Thus, the preferred solution ultimately comes down to a matter of
choice: Favor the victim or favor the defendant and the public.
While seemingly an unpopular choice, the interests of the defendant
and the public outweigh the victim's interests. The costs incurred by the
public as a result of the participation of crime victims in the prosecution of
environmental criminal defendants are well-documented in this Note,194 but
these inefficiencies alone are not enough to tip the balance. 9 5 However,
when coupled with the potential prejudice to defendants, these interests do
outweigh the victim's. Despite the legitimate interest that victims have in
participating in the prosecution of the accused, the defendant's rights
should still prevail. Our criminal justice system's predilection for the rights
of defendants is evident in the Bill of Rights, which guarantees the
defendant's right to due process of law;19 6 notice of charges against him;
assistance of counsel; the right to confront adverse witnesses; and a fair,
speedy, and public trial by a jury drawn from the community. 19 "The
number of amendments in the Bill of Rights devoted to protecting
defendants from government authority demonstrates the Framers' concern
for ensuring the adversary process is fair."' 98 While Congress had the
opportunity to codify the rights of victims along with the rights of
192. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (describing how environmental
law's aspirational. qualities, evolutionary nature, and high degree of complexity distinguish it
from other areas of the law).
193. See supra Part V.C (noting how each solution will result in one party assuming
more harm than the others).
194. See supra Part V.13.2 (citing delays in the prosecution and the difficulty in
securing plea agreements as two of the costs incurred by the public).
195. Even though Congress made a policy decision understanding that the CVRA
would likely result in increased prosecutorial costs, this alone is likely not enough to exclude
victims of environmental crimes from the Act.

196.

U.S. CONST.

197.
198.

Id amend. VI.
Blondel, supra note 5, at 247.

amend. V.
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defendants in the Bill of Rights, it passed a statute instead.199 Given the
Framers' concern for protecting the rights of defendants and the dangerous
potential for prejudicing defendants in environmental criminal prosecutions,
the defendant's interests outweigh the victim's in environmental criminal
prosecutions.
It is also important to note that victims are not completely shut out of
the courtroom under this solution. Victims of environmental crimes could
still bring civil lawsuits against the defendant "and get any harm remedied
and get compensation. 200
Considering the fact that all of the
environmental criminal cases utilizing the CVRA to date involve corporate
defendants, 201 most victims in these cases will be able to make recoveries in
civil suits against the defendants. In many circumstances, 202 the victim's
case is simplified by the doctrine of negligence per se, which allows victims
to establish negligence by demonstrating a violation of a federal statute,20
which occurred in each of the criminal cases analyzed in this Note.
While victims of environmental crimes understandably might want
more than monetary compensation for their suffering, their exclusion from
the criminal proceedings does not mean that criminal charges against the
defendant will be dropped. It simply means that an experienced prosecutor
must understand that his or her decision to prosecute or reach a plea
agreement with the defendant affects not only the defendant and the public,
but also the victims in the case. Considering this adversarial form of
criminal prosecution has existed in North America since 1704 ,
prosecutors should be able to fulfill their duties to the public and the
victims regardless of victim input. In any event, the fair and timely
prosecution of environmental criminal defendants likely requires that the
199. See supra Part III.B (describing Congress's decision to pass a statute instead of a
constitutional amendment to protect victims' rights).
200. Baldas, supra note 7, at 4.
201. See supra Part IV.C (noting that all of the cases involving environmental crimes
that invoke the CVRA to date involve corporate defendants).
202. See David N. Zeehandelaar, The Relationship Between Statutory and Tort Law:

The Effects

of a Statutory Violation on a Negligence Lawsuit,

SP059 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 875, 880

(2009) (stating that courts in California, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, New
York, and Ohio have expressly provided that a violation of a federal environmental statute
constitutes negligence per se and that it is probable that many more states will find so as
well).
203.

DAN~ B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS

315 (2000) (explaining how courts utilize

negligence per se to "apply the standard or rule of conduct from a nonprescriptive statute" to
demonstrate negligence).
204. Boland & Butler, supra note 2, at 8-9.
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victims of these crimes take a back seat throughout the criminal
proceedings.
VI. Conclusion
Crime victims play an important role in society and in the criminal
justice system, and their presence should not be marginalized unnecessarily.
However, it is important to note that crime victims are not the only
participants in the criminal trial of the accused, and their rights should not
be granted at the expense of the defendant's rights or the criminal justice
system's efficiency. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the context of
environmental crimes, where the complicated nature of the crimes provides
greater opportunities for delays in proceedings, prejudice to the defendants,
and increased costs and time on the prosecution. 0 This observation is not
meant to belittle the concerns of victims of environmental crimes.
However, it is evident that environmental law is different than any other
area of the law,2 0 and therefore the utilization of the CVRA by victims of
20
environmental crimes results in consequences not foreseen by its drafters . 1
Additionally, by preventing victims of environmental crimes from
participating in these trials, they are not completely shut out of the
courtroom as they could continue to utilize the civil law process to obtain
remedies and be made whole. Therefore, in order to avoid extensive harm
to environmental criminal defendants and the public, the CVRA should be
amended to exclude victims of environmental crimes from the Act.

205. See supra Part IV.C (identify'ing several environmental criminal cases in which
these issues sprung up).
206. See supra Part I1.13 (discussing how certain characteristics distinguish
environmental law from other areas of the law).
207. See supra Part MVA (noting how the legislative history of the CVRA focused on
victims of violent crimes).

